By Hans van de Ven
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Through the Nineteen Twenties, China's intellectuals referred to as for a brand new literature, a brand new approach of suggestion and new orientation in the direction of smooth lifestyles. generally known as the may well Fourth stream or the hot tradition flow, this highbrow momentum spilled past China into the in a foreign country chinese language groups. This paintings analyzes the recent tradition circulation from a diaspora standpoint, specifically that of the in a foreign country chinese language in Singapore.
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Extra info for War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945 (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 10)
30 For the paternalistic but also coolly calculating Marshall, Stilwell was useful because he knew him well, could count on him to seek offensives that would convince the US public that the USA was doing its best, and could rely on his loyalty and support. The latter may have been important to offset the imperious and unpredictable General MacArthur, then in charge of the US army in the Far East. 32 Stilwell also did not insist on a substantial commitment of US military resources. 34 Stilwell furthermore was presentable as someone with a long familiarity with China and opposed to any imperialist designs of the British.
But Chiang also realised that after the fall of Burma, little US aid could be delivered to China. 86 Chiang clearly did not want the British to have control over this force and stated to Stilwell that an American should be in charge. 87 If for Chiang the retention of Stilwell was useful to keep control over forces now in India and for gathering up US supplies, for Stilwell here was an opportunity yet to obtain command over an army and be involved in a campaign against Japan and avenge his defeat.
Chiang went on to say that following the fall of Rangoon, the counter-offensive had to be scrapped. He feared an immediate Japanese offensive towards Tounggoo and stated that the defence of Mandalay should now be the main concern. He advocated a strategy of defence in depth, with a series of strong points between Tounggoo and Mandalay. With the local population sympathetic to the Japanese, Chiang argued, only in this way could troops fight without having to worry about security in the rear. 51 Even if mutual suspicion kept the Chinese and British apart, they did agree that after the fall of Rangoon, the best option was to retreat to the north.
War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945 (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 10) by Hans van de Ven